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Abstract 
 
It is well established that neurotypical individuals generally show better memory for 
actions they have performed than actions they have observed others perform or merely read 
about, a so-called “enactment effect”.   Strikingly, research has also shown that neurotypical 
individuals demonstrate superior memory for actions they intend to perform in the future (but 
have not yet performed), an effect commonly known as the “intention superiority effect”. 
Although the enactment effect has been studied among people with ASD, the current 
study is the first to investigate the intention superiority effect in this disorder. This is 
surprising given the potential importance this issue has for general theory development, as 
well as for clinical practice. As such, this study aimed to assess the intention superiority and 
enactment effects in twenty-two children with ASD, and 20 IQ/age-matched neurotypical 
children.  The results showed that children with ASD demonstrated not only undiminished 
enactment effects in recognition and source memory, but also (surprisingly for some theories) 
typical intention superiority effects. The implications of these results for theory, as well as 
clinical practice, are discussed.  
 
Keywords: Autism spectrum disorder; Recognition memory; Source memory; 
Intention superiority effect; Enactment effect; Action monitoring; Episodic foresight; Motor 
encoding 
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It is well established that neurotypical individuals show significantly better memory 
for actions that they have performed themselves, compared to actions that they have observed 
others perform, or actions they have merely read about (Baker-Ward, Hess, & Flannagan, 
1990; Engelkamp, 1998). Superior memory for actions one has performed is a robust effect 
within memory, and is typically known as the “enactment effect”. Strikingly, however, 
studies have shown that it is not just memory for actions one has performed in the past that 
hold a privileged status in memory, but also memory for actions one intends to perform in the 
future (e.g., Goschke & Kuhl, 1993; Marsh, Hicks, & Bink, 1998).  That is, individuals 
typically demonstrate better memory for actions when they make a plan to perform them at a 
future point than for actions they do not plan to perform. This “intention-superiority effect” 
appears to be consistent, as evidenced by superior recall (Jahn & Engelkamp, 2003; Koriat, 
Ben-Zur, & Nussbaum, 1990; Maylor, Chater, & Brown, 2001), superior recognition (Jahn & 
Engelkamp, 2003), faster recognition latencies (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993), and faster lexical 
decision latencies (Marsh et al., 1998) for content associated with actions individuals intend 
to perform than for content associated with actions they do not intend to perform.  
One possible explanation for the intention superiority effect is that, at the point of 
encoding one’s intention, individuals imagine themselves actually carrying out that action at 
the appropriate future point.  Engaging in such “episodic foresight” (or “episodic future 
thinking” / “prospection”, as it is sometimes known) may result in particularly deep encoding 
of intended actions, which enhances subsequent memory for those actions relative to actions 
that one has not imagined performing. In line with this argument, it has been suggested that 
the chances of actually carrying out a previously formed intention increase when the context 
the intention is formed and encoded in is similar to the context it will be retrieved in (Gilbert, 
Armbruster, & Panagiotidi, 2012).  Studies have also shown that mentally imagining a visual 
image actives the neural areas associated with viewing that visual image (see e.g., Stokes et 
al., 2009). As such, when people form an intention to carry out a plan in the future (e.g., 
planning to turn off the bath taps before the water overflows), mentally imagining performing 
this intended action in the future (e.g., imagining yourself turning off the taps at the 
appropriate time) should increase the chances of the intention being carried out, as such 
mental simulation should increase the similarity between encoding and retrieval contexts. 
Following a similar argument, Brewer and Marsh (2010) have suggested that one’s 
prospective memory ability (the ability to remember to carry out an intention at a future 
point) may be influenced by episodic foresight, and also suggest that engaging in episodic 
foresight processes during the encoding of an intention should strengthen the association 
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between that intention and it’s retrieval cues (thus making it more likely that a future 
intention will be carried out at the appropriate moment). Indeed studies have shown that an 
individual’s episodic foresight ability significantly predicts one’s prospective memory’ 
ability (Nigro et al., 2014), and asking individuals to imagine a future event produces a 
significant improvement in their ability to carry out that event correctly in the future 
(Paraskevaides et al., 2010; see also Ford et al., 2012). 
Although it is arguably intuitive to assume that episodic foresight 
underpins/contributes to the intention superiority effect, there is an alternative explanation of 
the effect that does not invoke such high-level mental simulation.  Instead, some have 
suggested that it occurs as a result of the encoding of additional motor information associated 
with the to-be-performed action (Freeman & Ellis, 2003; Koriat et al., 1990).  Specifically, it 
has been suggested that when an individual encodes an intention to perform an action in the 
future, they activate motor information associated with performing that action.  Thus, the 
planned actions are encoded in multiple formats, including an action-based format, which 
enhances subsequent memory for them.  If this is true, then the intention superiority effect 
can be considered an extension of the enactment effect.      
As discussed above, it is well established that neurotypical individuals show 
significantly better memory for actions that they have actually performed than actions that 
they have observed others perform, or actions they have merely read about (Baker-Ward et 
al., 1990; Engelkamp, 1998).  This enactment effect is widely considered to result from 
additional motoric components involved in performing an action, leading to that action being 
more deeply encoded than actions than have been observed/read about (Engelkamp & 
Zimmer, 1989).  Along these lines, it has been suggested that the intention superiority effect 
could be considered an intention enactment effect, and superior memory for intended actions 
is purely the result of sensorimotor information encoded when an intention is formed 
(Freeman & Ellis, 2003), which leads to that intention is encoded more deeply.  Whether the 
future thinking theory or the motor theory provides a better explanation of the intention 
superiority effect is not yet clear, but either way the study of this effect has relevance for our 
understanding of autism spectrum disorder (ASD). 
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a developmental disorder diagnosed on the basis 
of social-communication deficits, and fixated interests and repetitive behaviours (see 
American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  At the cognitive level, ASD is thought to be 
characterised by a particular profile of strengths and limitations in memory functioning  (see 
Boucher & Bowler, 2008) For example, on the one hand, there is robust evidence that 
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individuals with ASD manifest impairments in both episodic memory, the ability to recall 
personally-experienced events, as well as episodic foresight, the ability to imagine events that 
are likely to be experienced in the future (Lind & Bowler, 2010; Lind, Bowler, & Raber, 
2014; Lind, Williams, Bowler, & Peel, 2014; Terrett et al., 2013). Recent evidence has also 
indicated a substantial deficit in prospective memory, at least when spontaneous (as opposed 
to prompted) retrieval of prior intentions is required for successful completion of a planned 
action (see e.g., Altgassen, Koban, & Kliegel, 2012;  Williams, Boucher, Lind, & Jarrold, 
2013; Williams, Jarrold, Grainger, & Lind, 2014).  On the other hand, there is highly robust 
evidence that individuals with ASD show a typical enactment effect in memory.  In a review 
of 13 studies of the enactment effect in ASD, Grainger, Williams, and Lind (2014) reported 
that out of 21 analyses comparing memory for self-performed vs. observed actions in ASD, 
17 did not find any between-group differences in the size of the enactment effect.  On 
average, across studies involving a sum total of 239 individuals with ASD and 240 
comparison participants, memory for self-performed actions was 10% better than memory for 
observed actions among individuals with ASD, and 11% better among comparison 
participants (a negligible difference between groups; Cohen’s d = 0.11).  This suggests 
strongly that individuals with ASD are able to monitor their own actions and that this 
monitoring enhances memory in a typical manner (see Williams, 2010). This pattern of 
impaired episodic memory in ASD, but intact action monitoring ability, supports the 
suggestion that individuals with ASD demonstrate selective impairments in self-awareness 
(see e.g., Williams, 2010), demonstrating typical physical self-awareness (e.g., action-
monitoring ability) but impairments in mental self-awareness (e.g., episodic memory) .  
 
The current study 
Despite the significant amount of research among people with ASD investigating the 
potential underpinnings of the intention superiority effect (i.e., future thinking, motor 
encoding), the intention superiority effect itself has – surprisingly – never been explored in 
this disorder.   This is striking given the potential importance of this issue for general theory 
development, as well as for clinical practice (see p. 16 for a discussion). In the current study, 
the intention superiority effect, as well as the enactment effect, was explored among 22 
children with ASD and 20 age-, IQ-, and sex-matched neurotypical comparison participants.  
During the experimental task, participants were presented with a series of written action 
phrases (e.g., “turn on the spot”) during a study phase.  On one third of trials, participants 
were asked to read the action statement aloud (Read condition).  On another third of trials, 
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they were asked to silently read and perform the action stated (Enact condition).  Finally, in 
another third of trials still they were asked to silently read and were told that they would 
complete the action at the end of the task (Intend condition).  Subsequently, participants’ 
recognition and source memory for studied actions was assessed in a test phase.   
Given the robust evidence that, among individuals with ASD, a) episodic foresight is 
impaired, and b) action monitoring is unimpaired, contrasting predictions can be made about 
the likelihood that the intention superiority effect will be diminished in ASD.  On the one 
hand, if the intention superiority effect requires episodic future thinking, then the effect 
should be diminished in ASD.  On the other hand, if the intention superiority effect results 
from additional encoding of motor information, then the intention superiority effect should be 
undiminished in ASD.  The inclusion of an enactment condition (in which participants 
actually perform the written action phrases during the study phase) provides a further 
opportunity to confirm that action monitoring is unimpaired in ASD and, more importantly, 
to assess the relation between the intention superiority effect and the enactment effect in 
ASD.   
 
Method 
Participants 
 Twenty-two children with ASD and 20 neurotypical comparison children took part in 
this experiment, after they and their parents had given written, informed consent.  Participants 
in the ASD group had formal diagnoses of Autistic Disorder or Asperger’s disorder, 
according to established criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 2000; World Heath 
Organisation, 1993).  To assess severity of ASD features, parents of participants with ASD 
completed the Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS; Constantino et al., 2003).  In all but one 
case, participants with ASD scored above the defined cut-off for ASD on the SRS (total score 
≥ 60; Constantino et al., 2003).  The remaining participant scored 55, which is just below the 
conventional ASD cut-off of 60.  This participant had a formal diagnosis of Autistic Disorder.  
 Parents of neurotypical children also completed the SRS.  All but one participant in 
the neurotypical group scored below the defined cut-off for ASD, with one participant 
scoring just above the cut off (66).  After removing these participants from analyses, none of 
the results (or the study conclusions) changed substantively (i.e., no p value changed from 
significant to non-significant or vice versa, and no effect size changed category – small, 
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moderate, large), and thus these participants were included in analyses.  Using the Wechsler 
Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999) the groups were equated closely 
for verbal IQ (VIQ), performance IQ (PIQ), and full-scale IQ (FSIQ).  Both groups were also 
equated closely for chronological age.  Participant characteristics are presented in Table 1. 
Materials and Procedures 
The Intention Superiority Task consisted of a study phase and a test phase.  During 
the study phase participants were presented with 45 action phrases, each containing a key 
action word, 15 of which they read (Read condition), 15 of which they performed (Enact 
condition), and 15 of which they made the intention to perform at the end of the task (Intend 
condition).  Three different 15-item lists of action phrases (e.g., “rub your stomach”) were 
used as stimuli during the study phase of the task.  A set of 45 novel action words was also 
compiled, which was used for the purpose of providing “lure” items during the test phase of 
the task.  All four lists were equated for mean syllable length and mean spoken word 
frequency of action phrases, as indexed by Kucera and Francis (1967) and reported in the 
MRC Psycholinguistic Database (Coltheart, 1981).  The adequacy of this matching was 
confirmed by a non-significant effect of List in a multivariate ANOVA (using Wilks’ 
Lambda criterion) that included syllable length and word frequency as the dependent 
variables, F (3, 86) = .20, p = .894,   = .007.  During the study phase, each of the 15 item 
lists was assigned to a different condition (Read, Intend, Enact), and the order in which lists 
were assigned to each condition was counterbalanced across all participants.  This created six 
different conditions of the task.  During each condition, action phrases were presented to 
participants in a different, pseudo-randomised order, in which no more than two action 
phrases from any one condition appeared on successive trials.  
Figure 1 shows a graphical representation of stimuli presentation on each trial of the 
task.  During the study phase, action phrases were presented to participants on a computer 
screen which participants stood 1 metre away from.  Participants were instructed that the 
beginning of each trial would be signalled by the presentation of one of three instructions 
(Read/Plan/Perform – corresponding to the conditions Read/Intend/Enact), which would 
appear individually at the top of the screen.  Participants were told that after the instruction 
word had been presented, it would be followed by an action phrase, presented directly below 
the instruction.  Participants were told that if the instruction “Read” appeared on the screen 
they should read the action phrase aloud.  If the instruction “Perform” appeared on the screen 
participants were told that they should mime (act out) the action phrase.  Finally, participants 
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were instructed that if the instruction “Plan” appeared on the screen they should make a plan 
to perform the action at the end of the task.  During each trial of the task the instruction word 
was presented individually on the screen for 1500ms, followed by the action phrase, which 
was presented below the instruction word for another 5000ms.   
Before completing the study phase of the task, participants completed a practice task, 
which consisted of six trials (two from each condition).  None of the action phrases that 
appeared in the practice task appeared during the experimental trials.  After participants had 
completed the practice task they completed the experimental trials.  During the experimental 
trials the experimenter observed the participant to check that they (a) performed the 
appropriate action on Enact trials of the task, (b) read aloud the action phrases on the Read 
trials, and (c) neither performed nor read the action phrases on Intend trials.  If a participant 
did not perform an action during an Enact trial the experimenter took note of this trial and the 
trial was subsequently removed during data analysis.  Similarly, if participants accidentally 
performed an action during a “Read” or “Intend” trial the experimenter took note of this, and 
this action phrase was also removed during data analysis.  Errors in following the condition 
instructions correctly were very rare (and only occurred on three trials across two 
participants).  Participants were informed, before starting the experimental trials, that after 
the study phase had been completed they would be asked some questions about what they had 
read, planned and performed, but were not explicitly told that their memory for the action 
phrases would be tested.   
After the study phase, participants completed the test phase.  Participants’ recognition 
and source memory for the action phrases was tested during this phase. Participants were 
shown the set of action phrases individually on the computer screen and were asked to judge 
whether each one was “old” (had been presented to them previously during the study phase) 
or “new” (had not been presented during the study phase).  If participants responded that an 
action phrase was old, they were asked to decide whether they thought the action was one 
that they had read, planned to perform, or actually performed during the task.  The 
experimenter recorded participants’ responses.   
 
Scoring 
Recognition memory performance. Recognition performance on the Intention 
Superiority Task was analysed using the measure of d-prime (d'), a parametric measure of 
item discrimination1.  As a measure of recognition performance three separate d-prime scores 
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were calculated using the formula below.  In this equation H represents a hit rate (the 
proportion of old items participants correctly identified as “old”) and FA represents false 
alarm rate (the proportion of new actions participants incorrectly identified as “old”).   
𝑑′ = 𝑧(𝐻) − 𝑧(𝐹𝐴) 
Three separate d' scores were calculated, using separate hit rates based on the 
proportion of enacted actions correctly recognised, the proportion of intended actions 
recognised, and the proportion of read actions recognised.  A single false alarm rate was used 
to calculate all three d' scores, since false alarm rates were derived from performance on 
distractor items, which by definition were neither read, intended nor enacted during the task.  
Source monitoring performance. Source monitoring performance on the 
experimental task was assessed as hit rates (the proportion of items participants made the 
correct source judgement for, for example the proportion of enacted items participants 
correctly identified as items they had performed).  Three separate hit rates were calculated, 
representing the proportion of enacted actions participants made correct source monitoring 
judgements for, the proportion of intended actions participants made correct source 
monitoring judgements for, and the proportion of read actions participants made correct 
source monitoring judgements for. 
Alpha levels and effect sizes. A standard alpha level of .05 was used to determine 
statistical significance and reported significance values are for two-tailed tests.  Where 
ANOVAs were used,  values are reported as measures of effect size (≥ .01 = small effect, ≥ 
.06 = moderate effect, ≥. 14 = large effect; Cohen, 1969).  Where t-tests were used, Cohen’s d 
values are reported as measures of effect size (≥.0.20 = small effect, ≥ 0.50 = moderate effect; 
≥ 0.80 = large effect; Cohen, 1969).  When correlations were used ≥ .30 was considered a 
small effect, ≥ .50 was considered a moderate effect and ≥.70 was considered a large effect 
(Cohen, 1969).  
Results 
Intention Superiority Task  
Performance in each condition of the intention superiority task in the ASD and 
neurotypical group can be seen in Table 2.  Before analysing group differences in 
performance, a series of one-sample t-tests was carried out to establish whether performance 
on the intention superiority task was at floor or ceiling level, for any of the memory 
measures.  These t-tests indicated that, in both the ASD and neurotypical groups, the 
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proportion of actions correctly recognised in each condition significantly differed from floor 
or ceiling level performance, all ts ≥3.47 , all ps ≤.003, as did the proportion of actions 
participants made correct source monitoring judgements for, all ts ≥ 4.55, all ps < .001.   
Recognition memory.  D-prime scores for recognition performance in each condition 
of the task (Read/Intend/Enact) are reported in Table 2, for both the ASD and neurotypical 
group.  A 2 (Group: ASD/neurotypical) × 3 (Condition: Read/Intend/Enact) mixed ANOVA 
was conducted on these data.  A significant main effect of Condition was found, F (2, 80) 
=118.50, p < .001,  = .75.  This reflected the fact that across both groups, recognition 
memory was significantly greater for actions participants had enacted than for actions 
participants had intended, and recognition memory for actions participants had intended was 
significantly greater than actions participants had read, all ts ≥ 3.13, all ps ≤ .003, and all ds ≥ 
0.42 (see Figure 2 for a graphical representation of these results). 
However, there was no significant main effect of Group, F (1, 40) =2.09, p = .156, = 
.05, and – more importantly – no significant interaction between Group and Condition F (2, 
60) = 0.38, p = .685,  = .01.  These results indicate that the ASD group demonstrated a 
similar pattern of recognition memory to neurotypical children on the task (demonstrating 
typical enactment effects and typical intention superiority effects).   
Source Monitoring.  Hit rates for source monitoring performance in each condition 
of the task (Read/Intend/Enact) are also reported for both the ASD and neurotypical groups in 
Table 2.  A 2 (Group: ASD/neurotypical) × 3 (Condition: Read/Intend/Enact) mixed ANOVA 
was conducted on these data.  A significant main effect of Condition was found, F (2, 80) = 
133.58, p <.001,  = .770.  This reflected the fact that participants, across both groups, 
demonstrated significantly better source monitoring performance for actions they had enacted 
than for actions they had intended to perform, and significantly greater source monitoring 
performance for actions participants had intended to perform, than actions they had read, all 
ts ≥7.75, all ps < .001, and all ds ≥ 1.57 (see Figure 3 for a graphical representation of these 
results). 
However, again there was no significant main effect of Group, F (1, 40) = 0.09, p = 
.768, = .002, and no significant interaction between Group and Condition F (2, 80) = 0.24, 
p = .788,  <.01.  As such, there were no significant differences between the groups in either 
overall levels or patterns of performance across conditions.   
To summarise, on both tests of memory (recognition and source monitoring) 
participants in both the ASD and neurotypical groups showed better memory for actions that 
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they had enacted than actions they had read or actions they intended to perform (thus 
demonstrating clear enactment effects).  Additionally, on both tests of memory participants in 
both groups showed better memory for actions that they had intended to perform than actions 
they had simply read (demonstrating intention superiority effects).  This pattern of memory 
performance did not differ between ASD participants and neurotypical participants on any 
measure, as indicated by no significant interactions between participants’ diagnostic group 
and their memory for read/intended/enacted actions for either recognition or source memory 
performance.   
Associations between the enactment effect and the intention-superiority effect 
In order to establish the extent to which the enactment effect (i.e., the memory gain 
from performing actions) was associated with the intention superiority effect (i.e., the 
memory gain from intending to perform actions), a series of partial correlations was run.  
Among each participant group, the association between recognition memory performance in 
the Enact condition and recognition memory performance in the Intend condition, controlling 
for recognition memory performance in the Read condition, was computed.  Likewise, the 
association between source memory performance in the Enact condition and source memory 
performance in the Intend condition, controlling for source memory performance in the Read 
condition, was computed.  Partialling out performance in the Read condition allows us to 
control for “general memory” ability in each of these analyses.  As such, gain an indication of 
whether the additional recognition/source monitoring benefit of enactment and the additional 
recognition/source monitoring benefit of intending to perform an action are related.   
For the ASD group, there was a significant association between memory for intended 
and enacted actions (when controlling for memory for read action), in both recognition 
memory, r = .64, p = .002, and source memory, r = .46, p = .034. These results indicate that 
the larger the enactment effect in children with ASD, the larger the intention-superiority 
effect, in both recognition and source memory. In the neurotypical group there was also a 
significant correlation between memory for intended and enacted actions in recognition 
memory, r = .50, p = .029. However, there was no significant correlation in source memory 
between memory for intended and performed action, r = .15, p = .546. Fisher’s z tests 
indicated that there were no significant differences between the ASD and neurotypical groups 
in the size of these correlations, all zs ≤ 1.04, all ps ≥ .30.  
 
Discussion 
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Until now, no study has explored the intention superiority effect in ASD.  As such, the 
primary aims of this study were to explore the extent to which individuals with ASD 
demonstrate a typical intention superiority effect, as well as to replicate the established 
finding of undiminished enactment effect among people with this disorder.  The central 
results from the study found no indication that children with ASD manifest diminished 
intention superiority or enactment effects in either recognition or source memory.  In each 
ANOVA, the critical Group (ASD/comparison) x Condition (Read/Intend/Enact) interaction 
effects were non-significant and small in magnitude.  This suggests that participants with 
ASD and comparison participants showed similar levels and patterns of performance on the 
experimental task; both groups showed an identical pattern of performance, recognising and 
monitoring the source of action terms that were enacted better than action terms that were 
intended to be enacted.  In turn, both enacted and planned actions were recognised and source 
monitored better than action terms that were merely read (hence, enacted actions > intended 
actions > read actions).   
It is interesting that the intention-superiority effect demonstrated by individuals with 
ASD was found in both source memory and recognition memory. Although recognition 
memory may potentially be underpinned by the semantic memory system (familiarity), 
source memory (which involves identifying something about the context under which a 
memory was acquired) is generally considered to be underpinned by the episodic system 
(recollection), because only episodic retrieval involves identifying the spatio-temporal 
context of the recollected episode (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Wheeler et al., 
1997). Given adults with ASD demonstrated typical intention-superiority effects on measures 
of both source memory and recognition memory, this suggests that the ISE observed in the 
ASD group was not specific to familiarity-based memory processes. However, although the 
test procedure used in the reported study tested memory using both familiarity and 
recollection-based measures, it was the case that memory performance on both measures was 
cued. As such, future research is needed to test whether the intention-superiority effect is 
typical during spontaneous retrieval of ones intentions. 
The finding that individuals with ASD also showed a typical enactment effect in 
recognition and source memory provides yet further evidence that action monitoring abilities 
(and, hence, a sense of agency) are undiminished and enhance memory for  completed actions 
in this disorder (see e.g., Grainger et al., 2014).  These results are in keeping with a large 
body of studies demonstrating undiminished enactment effects in ASD (Grainger et al., 2014; 
e.g., Hare, Mellor, & Azmi, 2007; Lind & Bowler, 2009; Maras, Memon, Lambrechts, & 
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Bowler, 2012; Summers & Craik, 1994; Williams & Happé, 2009), as well as with other 
studies of action monitoring in ASD (Blakemore et al., 2006; e.g., David et al., 2008; but see 
Zalla & Sperduti, 2015 for an alternative perspective).  Moreover, these results provide the 
first evidence about the ways in which planning to carry out actions in the future influences 
subsequent retrospective memory for those actions in ASD.  The finding of an undiminished 
(indeed, slightly enhanced) intention superiority effect in ASD suggest that forming the 
intention to perform an action in the future results in subsequently superior memory for that 
action among individuals with this disorder.  
From a clinical perspective, finding that individuals with ASD demonstrate typical 
intention superiority has important implications. Specifically, typical intention superiority in 
ASD could potentially be used as a method to support learning, particularly within the school 
environment.  In much the same way as the enactment effect and “subject performed tasks” 
have been utilised in educational contexts, and been shown to be beneficial to learning in 
children with ASD (Summers & Craik, 1994), so too could the intention superiority 
effect.  This is particularly important when it is not always practical to physically enact a 
task. In such cases asking children instead to plan to perform a task later (at the appropriate 
time) could prove to be a useful learning aid.  Learning techniques that utilise intention 
superiority in ASD may also be beneficial for supporting social interactions, helping 
individuals to remember social rules and hence reduce the amount of “online” processing 
needed during interactions. For example, asking children with ASD to plan performing 
specific strategies during social interactions (e.g., asking children to plan making eye contact 
with an individual when talking to them) may also prove a useful learning aid.  
Although the focus of the current study was on further understanding the nature of 
memory processes in ASD, the results may also be relevant to theories of the underpinnings 
of the intention superiority effect.  Individuals in the both the ASD and neurotypical group 
demonstrated typical enactment effects and typical intention superiority effects. Furthermore, 
in three out of four partial correlation analyses (across both ASD and comparison 
participants) the association between the intention superiority effect and the enactment effect 
was significant.  These results support the suggestion that the intention superiority effect and 
enactment effect rely on the same underlying processes, presumably motor encoding (see 
Freeman & Ellis, 2003 for further evidence in favour of the motor encoding theory).   
Whether “action superiority” can adequately and entirely account for the intention 
superiority effect is not yet certain.  It has been argued that often the specific motor 
components associated with a future intention are not known to an individual when they 
INTENTION SUPERIORITY AND ENACTMENT EFFECTS IN ASD 
14 
 
encode the intention, and some intentions may be too rich/complex to be represented through 
sensorimotor encoding (McDaniel & Einstein, 2007).  McDaniel and Einstein (2007) 
question whether individuals engage in sensorimotor encoding of complex intention such as 
the intention to take a trip (which itself encompasses the intention to perform several actions 
e.g., to pack your bag, check in to your flight, cancel your mail etc.).   
The underlying processes involved in intention-superiority are not yet certain. 
However this study has demonstrated that individuals with ASD demonstrate typical 
intention-superiority, in both recognition memory and source monitoring memory.    These 
findings represent a relative memory strength in ASD, and should thus inform intervention 
efforts aimed at remediating specific memory impairments in this disorder.  
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Footnotes 
1 It should be highlighted that when corrected hit rates (a non-parametric measure of 
recognition ability) are used to calculate recognition performance (instead of d’), none of the 
results (or the study conclusions) change substantively (i.e., no p value changed from 
significant to non-significant or vice versa, and no effect size changed category – small, 
moderate, large).  
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Tables 
 
  
Table 1:  Means (SDs) and inferential statistics for participant characteristics.  
 
 Group    
 ASD  
(n = 22; 19 male) 
Neurotypical  
(n = 20; 20 male) 
t p Cohen’s 
d 
Age (years) 13.42 (1.12) 13.22 (1.01) 0.62 .539 0.19 
VIQ 106.00 (19.34) 106.90 (14.43) 0.21 .838 0.05 
PIQ 106.05 (12.90) 109.80 (14.48) 0.89 .379 0.27 
FSIQ 106.73 (11.84) 109.50 (15.00) 0.67 .508 0.20 
SRS Total  83.59 (9.87) 43.25 (7.86) 14.45 <.001 4.52 
SRS: Social Responsiveness Scale (Constantino et al., 2003); VIQ = verbal IQ; PIQ = 
performance IQ; FSIQ = full scale IQ.   
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Table 2: Means (SDs) and inferential statistics for group differences in performance on 
the intention superiority task. 
Memory Type Condition Group     
  ASD 
(n=22) 
Neurotypical 
(n=20) 
 t p Cohen’s 
D 
Recognition (d’) Read 1.75 (0.73) 2.02 (0.65)  1.25 .220 0.39 
 Intend 2.06 (0.60) 2.26 (0.65)  1.04 .304 0.32 
 Enact 3.03 (0.83) 3.38 (0.74)  1.48 .147 0.45 
Source 
Monitoring   
(Hit Rate) 
Read .35 (.19) .36 (23)  .192 .848 0.04 
Intend .67 (.16) .63 (.19)  .615 .542 0.23 
Enact .90 (.08) .89 (.12)  .355 .724 0.10 
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Figures 
  
Figure 1: Graphical representation of the procedure used during the study phase of the Intention Superiority Task 
(providing an example of two trials). 
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Figure 2: Recognition performance (dʹ scores) for combined (neurotypical and ASD) 
groups for performance in each condition of the task.  Error bars represent standard error of 
the mean.   
  
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
Read Intend Enact
R
e
co
g
n
it
io
n
 p
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
ce
 (
d
')
Task Condition
INTENTION SUPERIORITY AND ENACTMENT EFFECTS IN ASD 
20 
 
 
Figure 3: Source monitoring performance (hit rate) for combined (neurotypical and 
ASD) groups for performance in each condition of the task.  Error bars represent standard 
error of the mean.    
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